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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MILDRED D. DUBOIS,
Plaint.ff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

F. RAY DUBOIS, JR.,

12820

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEl\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for a divorce in which the plaintiff
sought a division of the marital estate, almony and attorney fees.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The Court awarded the plaintiff a divorce on
grounds of mental cruelty and then, having ultimately
valued the marital estate at $581,911.00, awarded
respondent 60% of that estate, permanent alimony in
the amount of $375.00 per month and attorney fees in
the sum of $10,000.00. Appellant appeals from all portion of the Decree of Divorce excepting the awarding
of the divorce.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the value of respondent's
interest in the estate of Dr. Charles E. Hirth included
in the marital estate; the property awardecl to respondent
out of the marital estate, as expanded by the ahore,
fixed at $307,000.00; and to have the alimony and attorney fees awarded to respondent eliminated entirely.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and respondent were married on December 13, 1!:142, in San Antonio, Texas. Two children were
born to the parties, hoth of' whom arc now over the age
of 21. (T.T. 47-4-8)* On or about June 23, 1970, respornlent filed a Complaint in the District Court of Salt
Lake County seeking a decree of divoree on grounds
of mental cruelty and praying for an award of an
equitable portion of the marital estate, seeking alimony,
and praying for an award of attorney fees.
The case came on for trial before the Honorahle
.l\larcellus IC Snow, District Judge of the District
Court of Salt Lake County on .July 28, 2U arnl 30, 1!171.
On August 4, 1971, the Court issued a memorandum
opinion awarding the respondent an Interlocutory De·
cree of Divorce; valuing the marital estate at approximately $570,000.00; awarding the plaintiff GO% of the
marital estate as thus valued, establishing certain guide
lines for the division of the estate among the parties,

* (Note: T.T. refers to the Trial Transcript)
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and awarding the respondent alimony and $10,000.00
attorney fees. On January 10, 1072, the Court entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its
Decree of Divorce, which confirmed the awards set
forth in its memorandum opinion of August 4, 1971,
with the exception that $581,011.00 was accepted as the
Yalue of the estate rather than $S70,000.00. (F.F. 5-6)
The court, howe,·er, failed to offer any explanation for
this increase in the estate's valuation.
The Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law expressly excluded from the marital estate any
property which the respondent might succeed to by way
of an inheritance from the estate of Dr. Charles E.
Hirth. (F.F. 4)* Dr. Hirth died in ~lay, 1070, (T.T.
144) approximately one month hefore the respondent
commenced her action for a divo1Te. The respondent's
intrrest in this estate has been valued at approximately
$100,000.00 by respondent, less certain minor expenses
associated with the upkeep of Dr. Birth's burial site,
a bequest of $:!,000.00 to a church and the expenses of
a<lministcring the estate. ( T.T. 83-84) The minimum
net value of this inheritance to respondent was estimated
as being between $7;3,000 and *100,000.00 (T.T. 198).
In addition, the Court in its Findings of Fact failed to
mention or include within the marital estate the expectancy which the respondent has in her mother's estate.
Uncontradicted evidence indicates, in reference to this,

*

(Note: F.F. refers to the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law)
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that respondent will he the sole beneficiary of her
mother's estate, that this estate is valued at a minimum
of $150,000.00, (T.T. 199) and that her mother is aged,
feehle and living in a nursing home. ( T.T. 4i-48, 85-86,
93 and 140-41)
The Court also expressly found in its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law that the greater bulk of
the assets of the marital estate was de-rived from gifts
and inheritances received from respondent's side of the
family. (.F.11""'. 2) The underlying and uncontradicted
evidence indicates, however, that respondent received
only a total of $117,i>O!l.OO in gifts and inheritance from
her side of the family during the course of the parties'
marriage (T.T. 22), and that appellant received a total
of $66,137.00 in gifts ancl inheritances from respondent's
side of the family during that same period of time.
(T.T. 24) During that same time period, however, appellant contributed in excess of $500,000.00 in earned
income to the marital estate. (T.T. 152).

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
TI-IE C 0 UR T COMl\IITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR UY EXCLUDING
FRO.l\1 ITS VALUATION OF THE
l\IARI'l'AL ESTAT~~ THE VALUE OF
RESPONDENT'S INIIERITANCE IN
TIIE ESTATE OF DR. CHARLES E.
IIIRTH AND BY FAILING TO PROP-
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ERL Y CONSIDER THIS INHERITANCE AND THE RESPONDENT'S
EXPECTANCY IN HER .1\IOTHER'S
ESTATE WHEN IT DIVIDED THE
:MARITAL ESTATE.
A.

Utah law requires that property interests
which vest in either husband or wife prior
to the dissolution of the marriage be included within the marital estate and be
considered by the court in adjusting the
rights of the parties in that estate.

The trial court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law expressly excluded from the marital
estate respondent's vested inheritance in the estate of
her uncle Dr. Charles E. Hirth. (.F'.F. 4) The minimum
value of this inheritance was established by the evidence
as being between $75,000.00 and $100,000.00. (T.T.
198)

In lJicDonald v. 1llcDonald, 120 Utah 573, 576-83,
23() P.2d 1066 ( 1951), this Court held that the trial
court had properly taken into consideration, in adjusting the financial affairs of the parties, an inheritance
which the wife had received approximately one year
before the initiation of the divorce proceedings in question but subsequent to the commencement of the marital
difficulties between them. Accord, 1llichel.'len v. lJiichelscn, 14 Utah 2d 328, 329-30, 383 P.2d 932 (1963}; cf.,
Woolley v. Woolley, 195 P.2d 743 (Utah 1948). It
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should be noted that these cases arc in accord with the
decisions of courts in other jurisdictions which have
held that property interests vested in a party at the time
of the divorce, although not presently rc(luced to that
party's possession, are to be considered in adjusting the
financial and property affairs of the parties. Schreiber
v. Schreiber, 224 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1Hu9); Clarke v.
Clarke, 188 N.E. 2d 619 (Ohio, 1963); Smyth v.
Smyth, 179 P.2d 920 (Okla. 1947)
B.

Under Utah law contingent future interests must he considered by the trial court
in adjusting the parties' rights in the marital estate.

In view of the court's award of sixty percent of
the marital estate to the respondent from which it excluded respondent's veste1l inheritance in the estate of
Dr. Charles E. Hirth, the approximate net value of
which was established by the evidence as being between
$7;'5,000.00 and $100,000.00, ( T.T. 198) it is clear that
the court completely failed to give any consideration. to
the respondent's expectancy in her mother's estate,
which was valued hy uncontradicted testimony at a minimum of *J;>0,000.00. (T.'l'. 199), and whieh the trial
court completely failed to mention in its Findings of
]<'act and Conclusions of Law or in its l\Iemorandum
Opinion, when it divided the marital estate. In lllacDonald v. ft! acDonald, ,11u pra, this court held that the
wife's expectancy in the estate of her aged mother was
rightly considered by the trial court in adjusting the fi-
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nancial affairs of the parties. 120 Utah at pp. 578 and
582; cf., James v. James, 248 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Ky.
1952), where the court affirmed a lump sum alimony
award, which is akin to a property settlement award,
which was based in part upon the husband's expectancy
in his mother's estate, he being the only heir.
POINT II
THE COURT COl\11\IITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ADl\IITTING EVIDENCE THAT WAS BASED UPON
THE THEORY THAT THE l\IARITAL ESTATE OF THE PARTIES
WAS A TRUST CORPUS AND THE
APPELLANTITSTRUSTEEANDBY
ADOPTING THAT THEORY AS THE
BASIS OF ITS DIVISION O:F THE
MARITAL ESTATE.
A.

The Utah Courts have never interpreted
or applied either U.C.A. Section 30-2-1,
or Section 2 of Article XXII of the
Utah Constitution relating to the emancipation of married women, to the division
and distribution of the marital estate in
a divorce proceeding, but rather, have always treated the powers granted them
under U.C.A. Section 30-3-5 as pervasive,
allowing them to reach all of the properly
of both the husband and the wife.
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Respondent's attorney argued that since the relation of husband and wife is one of trust and confidence,
any contribution to the marital estate by the wife or her
family constituted a trust corpus, which, if managed hy
the husband along with his contributions to the family
estate, constituted him a trustee. ( T. T. 242-248) .l\loreover, according to this theory, when discord subsequently erupts between the parties, this trust relationship
dictates that all of the trust assets, as originally contributed by the wife or her family, be traced, their productivity noted and a comparison made between their current n1lue and a capitalized value utilizing an arbitrarily
selected figure of seven percent. ( T. T. 26-3.5) Then,
if the current value of these assets is less than their
hypothetically calculated capitalized value, the husband's
contributions to the marital estate are to be surcharged
for the difference. Then, the actual or capitalized value
of these assets, whichever is greater, is awarded to the
wife as her separate property. (T.T. 22-34 and see
plaintiff's Exhibits P-2 and P-3).
_1\Iorcover, in calculating these values, you assume
that all of the living expenses of the parties were paid
out of the husband's contributions (T.T. 4:3), and you
ignore any gifts or inheritances which the parties may
have received from the husband's side of the family
(T.T. 41). You also ignore the investment philosophy,
goals, or practices of the husband ( T. T. 44) and you
neglect to deduct, in calculating the capitalized value
of the trust assets, any gifts which the parties may have
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made to their children during the course of their married lives ( T. T. 45) .
Respondent's attorney recognized when he proffered this theory to the court that there was no precedent for it under Utah law (T.T. 242). However, not
only is there no precedent under Utah law for the acceptance or use of such a theory, but this court has
itself previously considered such a theory and flatly
rejected it. Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422
P.2d 192, 193-35 ( 1967). In that case the plaintiff's
wife appealed from a judgment of the trial court
wherein she had been awarded one-third of the parties
total net assets plus $200.00 per month as alimony and
$900.00 for attorney fees. The defendant husband had,
during the course of the parties' marriage, engaged in
a variety of business ventures unrelated to his regular
job. Unfortunately, these ventures suffered a number
of severe reverses and, at the time of divorce, the
marital estate had liabilities in excess of $71,000.00,
with a net worth of approximately $10,000.00. The
plaintiff argued on appeal that their business debts
should "be paid by the defendant out of his earnings
and that she should be awarded one-half of all property
remaining· after these obligations ... [have been] paid
in full." 4~~ P .2d at pp. 193-94. The court in response
to this argument held that:
"It is novel doctrine that would leave the husband with the accumulated liabilities of 30
years of married life and award to the wife

10
one-half of the net assets free and clear of
these debts. Any business venture is accompanied by some risk of failure and to say that
because the husband managed these investments it is his loss but that she will nevertheless share in the profitable portion of his
financial endeavors, is an untenable suggestion. She married him "for bette1 or worse."
This does not mean the "better" for her and
the "worse" for him. 422 P.2d at p. 194.
This result is completely in accord with the general rule that all of the property of the parties, including their separate property is subject to the control,
direction and disposition of the divorce court when the
statute involved directs the court to make such dispositions of the parties' property as it deems equitable. 24
Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation§ 926. The statute
which is controlling here, U.C.A. § 30-3-5, utilizes this
language and this court has always interpreted the
power granted it thereunder broadly. See, for example
the "iJI acDonald and JJ-/ichelsen, cases discussed, supra,
under Point I.
Not only was evidence based upon respondent's
"Trust" theory erroneously admitted over appellant's
objections, (T.T. 22, 34-35 & 46) but it is obvious from
the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
that it was influenced thereby in making its property
award to the respondent. One example of this influence
is the court's findings that the appellant abused the re-
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spondent's trust in him by creating an imbalance of investments in his own favor. (l..... F. 2-3}
l\Ioreover, it is only on the basis of such a theory
that it would be possible for the court to find that the
bulk of the assets in the marital estate had been produced from gifts and inheritances from respondent's
side of the family. This is so because respondent's own
testimony and evidence establishes that her side of the
family during the course of the parties' marriage, contributed only $117,509.00 by way of gifts or inheritance
to her, and that they gave only an additional $66,137.00
to the appellant. (T.T. 24} These figures ignore, of
course, the value of the vested inheritance which respondent will receive from Dr. Hirth. In contrast to
the total contributions of approximately $183,000.00 by
the respondent's family, $66, 137.00 of which was given
to appellant and not to respondent, the appellant contributed over $.300,000.00 in earned income. (T.T. 1.52}
This uncontradicated evidence, coupled with the court's
other findings, compels the conclusion that the trial
court committed reversible error by admitting evidence's
based on respondent's "Trust" theory and by adopting
that theory as the means of allocating the property contained in the marital estate.

POINT III
THE COURT CO.l\IMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY AW ARD ING RESPONDEN1.' ALIMONY.
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A.

Under Utah law, an award of alimony
must be based upon the reasonable needs
of the wife and in connection therewith,
the court must consider those needs in relation to all of her present and prospective
assets.

It appears to be generally accepted by most courts,
including this Court, that the decision of whether or
not to award a party alimony cannot be divorced from
the property which the court awarded each party or
from the total assets and resources of each party, including contingent future interests.
In Utah, the general rule is that an award of alimony must be based upon the reasonable needs of the
party concerned. Openshaw v. Opcn:~hmt, 12 P.2d 364,
368 (Utah 19H2); and Allen v. Allen, 165 P.2<l 872
(Utah 1946). Having determined what these needs are,
however, the court must then determine the amount of
alimony that will be necessary to satisfy these needs in
relation to all of the assets of the wife, including the
assets awarded to her in the divorce proceeding and those
which she will likely succeed to in the future. 1JlacDonald v. JlacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066
( 1951); Cf. Stuckey v. Stuckey, 41 Cal. Rptr. 792
(1964); ]Jenning v. ]Jenning, 362 P.2d 124 (Ariz.
1961); Baugher v. Baugher, 408 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1965);
Dworkis v. Dworkis, 111 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1959); Richards v. Richards, 355 P.2d 188 (Haii. 1960).

In the instant case the trial court awarded re-
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sporulent approximately $347,044.00 0f an estate valued ultimately by the court at $581,911.00. The
court, as noted above, expressly excluded from the
estate respondent's vested inheritance from Dr. Hirth.
l\Ioreover, there is no indication in the record or in the
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that
it took either respondent's inheritance from Dr. Hirth
or her expectancy in her mother's estate into account
when it awarded her permanent alimony in the amount
of $37 5.00 per month. :l\Ioreover, the record is also
barren of any evidence, other than generalized statements by respondent that she enjoyed a high standard
of living during the course of her marriage to appellant, ( T. T. 56-69) arnl her own self-serving statement
that she would need $750.00 per month in alimony to
make ends meet, (T.T. 69) of what her needs are. In
this regard, it is interesting to note that even without
taking respondent's expectancy in her mother's estate
into account, respondent's total assets should produce
approximately $29,.543.00 per year in income using
seven percent as an average rate of return and assuming that respondent's total assets would equal
$422,044.00, which figure is the sum of the $347,044.00

awarded respondent in this action and the minimum of
$7 5,000.00 in inheritance which she will receive or has
already received from the estate of Dr. Hirth. It is difficult to see how, in view of these facts, an award of
$37 5.00 per month in alimony to respondent can be considered equitable or in any other fashion justified.

14

POINT IV.
THE C 0 UR T COl\11\lITTED UEVERSIBLE ERROR BY AlVARDING
RESPONDENT ATTORNEY FEES.
A.

Under Utah law an award of attorney
fees to a wife in a divorce action is based
upon her need and in connection therewith, the court must consider all of the
present and prospective assets of the wife.

In Allredge v. Allrcdgc, 229 P.2d 681, 687 (Utah
1951), this court held that the rationale for allowing a
wife suit money and attorney fees is that she "normally
has no separate estate from which to pay for bringing
or defending the action." And in JVciss v. 1Vo:ss, 111
Utah 353, 364, 179 P.2d 1005 ( 1947), this court also
held that aw~rds for attorney's fees and suit money
may be made in the divorce decree "provided the necessity for such awards is found to exist." Accord, Riehards v. Richards, 3;35 P.2d 188 (Haii. 19GO); and Henning v. ]Jenning, 362 P.2d 121 (Ariz. 1961).
In the instant case, the respondent had, according
to her own testimony, approximately $9,000.00 in savings in her name at the time the parties separated, (T.T.
78) and she received thereafter, at appellant's request,
(T.T. 148) the annual rent check from the Illinois
farms in the amount of approximately $4,500.00 (T.T.
69 and 77) ..Moreover, appellant paid all of the accrued
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household hills before he left Utah in October, 1970
(T.T. Hfl). Additionally, appellant, from the time that
he separated from respondent in June, lfl70, until he left
the state in October, 1970, made voluntary support payments to respondent (T.T. 68). Even more important,
respondent was awarded $347,044.00 of the marital
estate by the court which is over $110,000.00 more
than the court awarded appellant. Additionally,
respondent has a vested interest in Dr. Hirth's estate
valued at a minimum of $75,000.00 (T.T. 198}, and
an expectancy in her mother's estate valued at a minimum of $150,000.00 (T.T. 199}. In view of the facts
that respondent's assets greatly exceed appellant's and
that she had sufficient income and liquid assets available
to her throughout the course of this action to satisfy
her needs and pay her bills, burdening appellant with
the payment of respondent's attorney fees is unnecessary. inequitable and unconscionable.
POINT V
THE COURT'S A'VARD TO RESPONDENT \\THEN VIEWED AS A
"THOLE l\'lANI~'ESTS AN INTENTION ON THE COURT'S PART TO
UNLAWFULLY PUN IS H APPELLANT.
A.

Punitive measures have no place in Utah
Divorce Law.
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In 1Vilson 'l'. TVilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977,
979 ( 1956), this court expressly stated that,
"l'Ve recognize that there is no authority in
our law for aclministering punitive measures in
a divorce judgment, and that to do so would
be improper, except that the court may, and
as a practical matter invariably does, consider
the relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties
to their marriage vows, and their relative guilt
or mnocence in causing the breakup of the
. "
marriage.
The court also noted that rarely is there ever a
"wholly guilty or a wholly innocent party to a divorce
action." 296 P.2d at p. 979. The court then stated that
the proper approach is for the court "to endeavor to
provide a just and equitable adjustment of their economic resources so that the parties can reconstruct their
lives on a happy and useful basis." 296 P.2d at p. 979.
Accord, Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422
P.2d 192 ( 1967).
In the instant action there is uncontradicted testimony that appellant worked extremely hard ( 14-lG
hours per day) throughout the course of this marriage
and, as a consequence, generated earnings in excess of
$500,000.00. (T.T. 152) The appellant did this in order
to provide respondent with a very comfortable living
and to amass the assets which are at issue on this appeal.
On the other hand, respondent's only financial contri-
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hut ion to the marital estate, as valued hy the trial court,
was the gifts a rnl ill heritances "hi ch she received from
her family, ( T.T. 89) which only totaled $117,.509.00.
N obvithstanding these fact:'> arnl the fact that respondent is not suffering from any disability, the trial
comt did the following things: excluded certain assets,
contrary to Utah law, from the marital estate; adopted
a theory in regards to a husband's management of
the marital estate that is unique to Utah law and that
has in fact been expressly rejected pre,·iously by this
court; found against the weight of the evidence on the
basis of that theory, that the marital estate, as valued
by the court, had heen produced primarily from assets
contributed by respondent's family; ordered the estate
di,·ided on a 60-40 basis, an award which is unprecedented, for an estat~ as large as the instant one, under Utah
law; awarded respondent alimony in the amount of
*:375.00 per month despite the fact that there is no
need for such an award in view of the assets available
to and awarded to respondent by the court; and finally,
awarded respondent attorney's fees in the amount of
$10,000.00, although again there is no showing of need
on respondent's part and although in fact respondent,
by the court's actions, has been made a far wealthier
person than appellant.
All of these actions on the court's part when taken
together clearly manifest an unlawful intent to punish
appellant. These actions most certainly are not calculated to "minimize animosities" and aid the parties to

18
"reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful basis."
JVilson v. fVilwn, 5 Utah 2d 79, 83, 296 P.2d 977
(1956).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully requested that the Court set aside the property, alimony
and attorney's fees, awards of the trial court and exercise the authority which it has in a divorce action to review the record de not'o, 1Vilso11 t'. TVilson, 5 Utah 2d
79, 84, 296 P.2d 977 (1956); and 1Viese v. TViesc, 24'
Utah 2d 2:36, 2:38, 4G9 P .2d 504 ( 1970), by decreeing
its own judgment denying respondent alimony and attorney fees, ordering the inclusion of respowlent's inheritance from Dr. Hirth in the marital estate, awarding appellant $:-l~!J.911.00 of that estate which would
then be value at $G5U,911.00 (utilizing $75,000.00 as
the value of respondent's inheritance from Dr. Hirth)
and awarding respondent the remainder, which would
come to $307;000.00. In the alternative, appellant requests that the judgment of the district court be reversed in all particulars other than its award of a divorce to respondent and that the cause be remanded
with directions to eliminate the awards of alimony and
attorney fees, to recalculate the value of the marital
estate and to distribute it in accordance with the directions of this Court.
Dated this 23rd day of June, 1972
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